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F0R RELEASE FRIDAY A. M., l\1arch 16, 1973
CHINA

~~D

THE UNITED STATES

THE NEH CONGRESS AND THE NEW CHINA :

AN AGENDA FOR ACTif'lN

Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
before the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Study
Washington, D.

c.

Thursday , March 15, 1973

8 :15 P. M.
With Peking as the epi-center, the pattern of international relationships in Asia has undergone a series of earthquakes .

The repercussions have been deep and pervading .

vfuen

a new structure of stability emerges in the V/estern Pacific,
it will manifest far-reaching changes .

The main factors of

change are already evident and I whould like to list them at
the outset .

(1)

The tragic U. S. involvement in the war in

Indochina is, hopefully , at its tortured, dragged-ot·t end .
U. S. military power is moving off the Asian mainland .
(2)

ifuether the character of the People ' s Republic

has changed or our perceptions of China have improved is mcot;
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the United States has

elected~

at last, to close out the un-

declared .,.tar, the cC'ld \'l'ar, the prexy war, the peripheral war
with the Chinese People's Republic.

In turn, we have fo,·nd

the Chinese leadership in Peking most accommodating.

(3)

In a period of spreading peace, Japan possesses

the most dynamic economy in Asia.

The Japanese have skirted

the Tahtan quicksands and have come, instead, to terms with
the neN Chir.a .

They are now embarked on a multi-directional

diplomacy built on the base of a vast fC'reign trade.

Japan

moves still, with intense a\'Iareness of the United States, '!:>ut
no longer in the shadow of U.
(4)

s.

policy.

To whatever depth the wedge has been driven

between the Soviet Union and China, nc signs point to imminent
extraction; in the circumstances, Scviet pclicies which appear
to be in a state of

abeya~ce

in Asia, remain uncertain and

enigmatic .
An ancient Chinese prC'verb says that "a journey of
1,000 mlles begins with a single step . "

Actually it says a

- 3 "Journey

r.f

333 1/3 miles . "

tendency to overstate

But with an ancient American

anything involving China, we have even

managed tn inflate its proverbs .

In any event, the first step

and several more have already been taken in Sino-U .
ciliation .

s.

recon-

China and the United States are now moving rapidly

towards the normal relatinnships of peace .

This change has been

produced by the combined talents cf the nation's political cernmunity, as typified by the President, and nf the Academic community, as represented by Dr . Kissinger .

Democrats can hardly

ride the President's coattails on the China question, ncr, for
that matter, can other Republicans .

Whether Johns Hcpkins can

claim a share of cridit for Harvard ' s contribution , I leave to
your judgment .
It will help to understand how far we have ccme in
Sino- U. S . relations if we look for a moment at the
policy which was washed away in the
last winter .

That pnlicy was

Chou - Nix~n

~ne ~f b~ycott

it can be said to have begun with the

~ld

China

toasts in Peking

and ostracism and

inaugurati~n

of the
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People's Republic of China in Peking in 1949 .
we saw
of

~"~

~ot

At that

~ime~

the birth of new hope in China, but rather the dashing

r hopes for a durable peace after '·Jorld \-Jar II.

The new

government was viewed as not Chinese at all, but rather as an
alien outpost of a wor ldwide Communist conspiracy led by the
Soviet Union .

vie

told ourselves that it was bo\md to be short-

lived, soon to be overthrown by the righteous wrath of the
Chinese people .
This interpretation may seem somewhat incredible tonay .
However, I can assure those of you who are too

yo~ng

to remember

that it was the prevailing interpretation a quarter of a century
ago .

It was an inter pr etation spawned largely by the anxieties ,

fears and angers gener ated in the cataclysmic upheaval of the
Chinese revolution .
In

view of the distorted depictior of the new China

in 1949 and the sense of betrayal to \'lhich it gave rise in this
country, it is not surprising that American public life came to

- 5 be dominated by a nationwide \<li tch - hunt .

Everyv:here the

search went cut fer the culprits "who had lost China . 11

Educa-

tors, politicians, jnurnalists, ministers, bureaucrats, businessmen or whatever--none was exempt from the field-day of the
ideolocical carpet- baggers .
rati~nal

In the atmosphere of those times,

discussion soon gave way to a massive bi- partisan

denunciation of the new China .

Indeed, Democrats vied

\·1i

th

Republicans in expr essing a hostile aversion to v1hat ',ad
emerged in Peking .
The American mood in 1949 was oPe of fear, frustratio.
and fury .

Spearheaded by these emotions, it is little wonder

that we moved, almost eagerly, into the devastating peripheral
war vti th China in Korea .

Simul tar,eously, our diplomacy plunged

us i.to the middle of the Taiwan problem and opPned the door to
eventual direct military involvement in Indocnina and Scut!1east
Asia .

Every~t:here 1n

As:.a,

11

cof"'tainment cf China" \·1as enshri.lJed

as a cardinal objective of o r policies .

- 6 After the Korean truce and the Geneva Accords of 1954
the ·,:ings of a Sino - U. S. reconciliation beat feebly from time
to time but never vTith sufficient strength to rlispell a smoldering mutual resentment .

For many years, Department of State

representatives maintained intermittent contact with Chinese
diplomats in E'...1rope .

At no time, .1owever, did these meeti.11gs

confront the major isst:es .

:4hile European and other nations

were coming to terms with the People ' s Republic, the United
States under successive Presidents, reaffirmed time and abain
that Taiwan v1as China .

Insofar as this nat lor was concerned,

Peking was then and forever consigned to international limbo .
The Executive Branch engineered and Congress financed
a ring of military compacts around China ' s borders .

Links in

the chain \'lere formed by SEATO and Mutual Defense treaties

iii th

the Republic of China on Taiwan, Japan and the Republic of Korea .
With these treaties came a strengthening of the U.

s.

military

base structure throughovt Asia and the quasi-permanent

- 7 deployment of tens of
bases .

t~~Ol,;.Sands

Clf U. S . troops tt" man the

Tens nf billions of dollars poured forth for our

forces in the Far East and for massive aid and thousands cf
advisors to allies, new and old .
A stringent boycott was clamped on all trade with
the Chinese mainland.
nff .

Cultural and other contacts were shut

It became illegal to purchase even a pair of chopsticKs

in Hong Kong if they were fashioned in China, or to sell the
Chinese a pair of shoe- laces, even by way of a U. s .-o\med
factory in Canada .

As for our understandin

of the new China,

what we learned, we learned second-hand and more often than not
through the distorting prisms of Taiwan and Hong Kong .

An

American newsman who had the temerity to journey to China

1n

the face of an Executive Branch prohibition e-n all such travel
was

compelle~

subsequently, to go to cotrt to obtain a pass-

port to ply his trade abroad .
It was almost as thoue,h -v;e -r1ere determined to blot
out of our ken the very e:r:istence of the Chinese mainland and

- 8 what

\'la::> transpirin~

emerged in

thereon .

s~viet-Chinese

Even when serious difficulties

relations, we were at first incred-

ulous and suspected a joint plot aimed at the "Free Horld . 11
It \'las only much later that we were prepared to acknowledge the
reality and abandon the concept of a worldwide Communist monolith based on MoscO\'/ .
In doing so, however, we did not change our view of
the government in Peking .

He still saw the People ' s Republic

as a reckless, belligerent and PONerful Chinese dragon \'lith its
corralling as the end purpose of our Asian policies and programs.
All the while, it is now apparent, the Chinese people were seeing
themselves as a beleaguered, undeveloped country, beset on all
sides by enemies who had been marshalled by the United States
to undo the achievements of the Chinese

revol ~ tion.:

It is now known that during these years of ostracism,
the Chinese stress was not

~n

aggression beyond their herders,

but on military defense of their own territory .

It is no\'r

known, too, that the maximum emphasis of these years was given

- 9 to production for peace.:'ul purposes .
occupied with

feeding~

The Chinese Here pre-

clothing and sheltering three- quarters

of a billion people and witt developing a social and economic
structure which would give durability to the ideology of
Mao Tse- tung .

In r etrospectJ it is clear that we expended

billions in Asia to deter what we believed was an aggressive
China at precisely the time when Chinese enersies were being
redirected away from militant revolution into militant soc!al
reconstructl">n .
The gash in our understanding "''as largely selfinflicted .

To a large extentJ as I have indicatedJ we cut our-

selves off from what was happening inside China .
this exercise in ostrichism is incalculable .

The cost of

It had much to

do with leading more than two and a half million Americans into
the military

quag~ires

of the Asian mainla.d .

Thirty- three

thousand Americans rever returned from the hills and •alleys of
Korea where many died in unnecessary conflict

~'lith

vast Chinese
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armies north of the

38t~

parallel .

Another 46)000

gave their lives in the paddies and jungles of

A~ericans

Indochi~a .

The $150 billinn, plus, cost of the Vietnamese war pales in
comparison with the tragedy of devastated lives, of a shattered
national unity and of the decline in the general sense of wellbeing of the nation.
Nevertheless, the dollar price of this misbegotten
policy is not to be ignored .

The price is noH stated as up\·Tards

of $150 billion for Indochina alone but tr.e full costs of that
tragic adventure will be borne by the American people well into
the next century, with the present price-tag not doubling but
tripling .

The wastage stalks both our national and inter-

national footsteps .

It casts reflections in the ever-rising

prices at home and in the declining value of the dollar abroad .
It has left us ill-prepared for the emerging challenges of a
period of peace .
To be sure, the damage of t\'IO decades is dore and
cannot be undone .

I have sketched this past of China policy,
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not in recrimination ; fev1 of us Nho lived through the period
arc completely free of responsibility for the distortions .

I

have sketched it in some detail because an awareness of the
soil in which the old policy was planted is necessary to the
cultivation

~f

a fruitful new policy with regard to China and,

indeed, all of Asia.
As I have already noted, President
China last year marked a turning poirt .

chasm in Sino- American relations .

visit to

The visit, properly,

brought him public gratitude and acclal.,,., .
policy initiative has made possible the

Ni~on ' s

His greatest foreign-

narrowin~

of the vast

The remaining caP is closing

rapidly, more rapidly than anticipated in the most sanguine of
expectations a year ago .
In retrospect, it is clear that the Harm reaction at
home to the President ' s initiative indicated that the nation
had long-since been ready for a new look at the situation .

\·ihat

the President supplied was the missing ingredient- - the political
courage to acknowledge that we had been on the wrong track .
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From the

outset~

President 1 s initiati.ve .

Congress has supported the

The visits of

t~.r!

joint Senate

leadership and of the Holse leaders to China shortly after
the President ' s return underscored the

co~esiveness

Executive and Legislative Branches on this issue .
note in passing that long before Dr . Kissinger ' s

of the
I should

visit~

there had been exchanges between the Hhite House and the
Senate leadership with regard to the desirability of re establishing corununications \'11th Peking .

In fact, the

joint effort to open the door began with the first private
meeting between the President and the Senate Democratic
Leader at the 0utset of his first Administration, in fact,
in the first month .
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The President,
figure

n this

h~wever,

devel~pment .

had

t~

be and has been the key

He had to put before the ent·re

nation a revised estimate of the new Ch'na .

He had to

sh~ft

ritual1zed attitudes by 180) and he dtd so, tn my judgment,
\<Ji th

consummate skill.
Where, then, dJes

C~ngress

fit 'nto the

situation~

It can scarcely be sa:d that whJle the Ececutive Branch was
pursuing the

p~l·cy

of ostracism,

in the Senate on the Chirraissue .
was

c~ntent

to ride the

p~licy.

a hundred flowers bloJmed
For the most part, CJngr ess
Here and there, however,

individual Members and the Foreign Relat)ons
did make

c~ntributions

attitudes .
Univers·ty

~nd

~ther Co~~ittees

to recasting public understanding and

In Ma r ch 1968, five yeqrs ago 'n a lecture at the
~f M~ntana,

I expressed the view that

the basic adjustment wh)ch is needed ·n
p~licies

respecting China is

t~

make crystal clear

that th·s government does nJt anticipate, much less
does it seek, the overthrJw of the government on the
ChLnese mair.land .

In additiJn, there ·s a need tJ

- 14end the

discr'minat i~ n

infer ior status as

wh i ch

am~ng

c~ns1gns

t~

Chi ne an

the Communist countries

in this

nati~n's

policies respec t ing travel and

trade.

F'nally, it ought t o be made

unequ·v~cal

that we are prepared at all t imes t o meet wi th
Chinese representat i ves--f ormally or

tnf~ rmally-

in order to consider differences between China
and the United States over Viet Nam or any othe r
question of common concern .

The
so has

transiti~n

f oll~wed

in policy dur i ng the last year or

this pattern closely and the transit'on has

had support fr om the Senate, almost

t~

a man.

In due course,

I am confident Membe rs of both parties and both Houses will
j oin the expand'ng ranks of travellers t o China .

In so doing,

they wi ll familiarize themselves first-hand wtth the sltuation and, hence, sharpen their understanding
i ng devel o pments.
ne\<~Spaper

The

gl~wing

reports of

~f

heret ~fo re

cnlumnists \'lho have recently visited China

that such visits can serve

m~re

unf...,ldskeptical
:.nd~cate

effect ive l y as eye-o peners

than what is usually served for that purp?se at the bar of the

-15:ational Press Club.

China i s, indeed, heady stuf" and it is

m~st

desirable that, as we

~pen

our minds \'lith understanding and prudence .

pr~ceed

with the

It seems to me that the time is
Congress,t~

supplement a general

in'tiat'ves

~n

we

rappr~chement,

appr~aching f~r

of the President ' s

supo~rt

China with substantive legislative

The

acti~n .

93rd Congress :s just getting underway, and 1t can maKe a most
useful

c ~ ntributi~n

anti-Chinese
The
books.

by wiping the statutory slate c 1 ean

legislati~n

F?rm~sa Res~lut;on,

glves a

C~ngressi~nal

use of the U. S . Armed
f~rccs

of the past two decades .
f ~r

example, remains

It is a post - dated check whic h,

purp~ses,

on Taiwan.

F~rces

sole discretion
valid ity and,

~n

o~

t~

Formosa Resolution

~f

the

~s

out

~f

~n

the

all pract i cal
t~

the unfettered

to ass i st the Chinese

Nati~nal

Resolut i~ n~

the

use these forces :s left to the

the Execut i ve Branch.

re~rospect,

f~r

endorsement

Under the terms

question of how and when

the

~f

Whatever :ts

~riginal

it was a dubious one at best, the
keeping wi th the policy which the

- 16President is
of China.

n~w

cursuing in regard

t~

the

Pe~ple's Re~·blic

Even if that were nJt the case, I must express

grave reservations with regard to all blank-checks drawn on
the "war-and- peace

power s of the

C~ngress .

The Formosa

Resolution is remin iscent , for e xample, of the Tonkin Gulf
Res~lution

t~

which 'gr ea sed

1

slide into the milita ry

the way

f~r

~nvJlvement

the Executive Branch
jn Viet Nam .

If we have

learned anything f r om that experience, it ought to be that the
inttlation of the massive use of force by the United States at
the sole

discret~on

of one branch of government is a perilous

Constitutional pr actice.
The Formosa Resolution was originally destgned for
an eme r genc y, almost as a pe r sJnal accommodation to Pres ' dent
Eisenhowe r ; it has r emained on the statute books
what is now a disca r ded policy on China .

t~

susta · n

In 1971 the Fore:gn

Relat ons Committee voted t o repeal the Resolution .

This

was rejected in the Senate at the time by a vote of

~3 - 4~ .

tim~

act·~n

It is

again, it seems to me, to put the matter before the Congress .
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For many years, th"s nat1Jn helped tJ susta·n the
fictiJn that
China.

Taiwa~

spoKe for the hundreds of

In supoJrt of that

~illions

in

fiction, the United States funnelled

f've billion dollars ln military and econJmic aid lntJ an
lsland whose population at the JUtset of thts policy was less
than ten million .

This fJnancial stimulus produced spectacular

economic results .

It also served to pay fJr an over-sized,

highly mechan· t.ed Army and to Keep alive the hope of the National Government that these forces would one day
return to the Chinese

~ainl~nd .

~pe3rhead

That hope has ell but

a
d~s -

appeared in Taiwan, so, too, have the fenrs of a military
invasion

fr~m

the Mainland .

Economic aid to Taiwan has now been discontinued .
Spurred by great ;nputs of capital, in particular, from the
United States and Japan, the

~odernized

economy of Taiwan is

actually in a pJsLtion tJ extend aid to less-developed countries
in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere .

St'll flowing into

~he

however, is U. S . military aid in the form of hardware and

sland,
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advice·

~n

how t

Taiwan, a mil:tary
3ddition)

m~re

use

The United State5

'~.

advis~ry

than

S>1~0

~aintains>

on

group of 165 officers and men.

members of the armed

f~rces

In

are also

there in connection with ac t ivities related to VietNam.
The deployment of this large

f~rce

is obsJlete in

view of the Vietnamese truce and I am confident that the
Congress will concur in a dec ision to wi thdraw it .

The

President and the Congress, moreover> can and should worK
together to bring about the termination of the military aid
mission which remains as a vestige of our past involvement
in the Chinese civil war .
In addition, it should be noted that over $100
million in military grant aid and credit sales for Taiwan
were requested ?f Congress for the current fiscal year.

It

is difficult to see the sense in continuing to give away tens
of millions of U. S . dollars in this fashion .

As long as we

continue to provide military aid and advis ors t o
remain imbedded in what we have now

rec~gnized

Tal~;an,

to be an

we
~n~ernal

-19Chinese affair .

There :s every reason to assume that Ta'wan's

armed forces are

c~9able

t

Jf

defending tr.emselves.

ls hard tJ bel,eve that a U. S . aid

const\tutes the

marg~n

fJr survtval.

pr~gr3m

I n any event,

anv lJnger

Ways must be fJund fJr

preserving the stability Jf regtJns of the SJuth China Seas
Jther than fJr this
Jf

Chinese peJple

Jn

nat ~~n

t) c1nt'nue tJ arm a small segment

the :sland of Ta'wan against the rest .

AlthJugh the w!nds Jf change are sweeoing away
past policies

thr~ugh~ut

Asia, still intact is the r·ng

peripheral ant -Chinese treaties.
me, the tacit assumptiJn
States

Jf

From the JUtset, it

these treaties

Jf

see~s

tJ

s that the United

s an Asia power, which it is nJt, w1th a prime resoons -

bility fJr jnfluenc'ng and CJntrJll1.ng change Jn the Asian
mainland .

It is an assunpt•Jn which flJwed effJrtlessly

the decisive rJle
n WJrld ¥ar II.
years

~ld

~~ ~he

~rJm

United States in the defeat Jf Japan

It is an assumpt'Jn which is twenty-five

and needs tJ be examined afresh .
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The United States is, and will continue to be, a nation
with vast i nterests and responsibilities in the Pacific, interests
which extend to the western reaches of the ocean .

These interests,

however, do not compel us to continue to maintain, as we do,
260,000 armed men on the mainland and off- shore islands of the
Asian continent .

In a time of spreading peace,

f~rces

of this

magnitude appear unrelated to any valid interests of the United
States.

On the contrary, they seem more an expensive residue of

the predominant U.S . power which the

Un~ted

States asserted in

that region at the end of World Wa r II.
We need t o be aware that such residues do not come
cheaply .

They are paid for - -the people of the nation pay for · ·

them-- at a rate of many billions of dollars each year.

Expend-

itures of this k1nd have something to do with the rising cost of
food at home and the astronomical dollar price of hotel accommodations JnTokyo or Hong Kong .

I reiterate this theme because

there is a tendency to ignore the cost factors which are involved
;n anachronistic displays of our military power abroad and the

relationship
economy .

~f

this cost

t~

the debilitated state

~f

the

The presence of the flag on the beaches of Asia may

be as thrilling a sight as its appearance on the moon.

In

both cases, however, the thrill carries a very high price.
There is

n~

national interest whtch requires us to maintain

every major U. S. power-core abroad simply because there may
have once been a vital use for it .
In my judgment, the time has long been here for a
deliberate

phase-~ut

of all American installations and forces

which remain on the Asian mainland. The 40,000 plus U. S.
in

K~rea

tr~ops

are largely an irrelevant luxury, twenty years after the

end of the Korean war.

In the same category are the 45,000

U.S . forces in Thailand .

So, too, are many of the U.S . bases

and installations in Japan.
Treaties are not chiseled .n stone; much less are
executive agreements .

The Defense treaty with the Republic

China on Taiwan obviously needs

t~

be re-examined !n the

of the President's initiative with regard to Peking.

~f

ligh~

In a
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s · milar vein, the SEATO Treaty has sh·:nm • tself

t.:>

be: i n -.•iew

of the involvement in Indochina, not merely an inconsequential
rel ic of the past, but a devast i ngly costly enterprise and a
positive hazard to the interests o f this nation.
One of the justifications for the SEATO Treaty-which, 1n passing, I should no te, I signed at the request of
Pres i dent Eisenhower in Manila nineteen years ago--one of the
just i f ications for SEATO was the high hopes that lt would lead
i n time

t~

collective security and reg ional cooperation in Asia .

That hope never got off the ground, and, i n my judgment, the
tragic war in Indochina has now delivered Bcoup-de-grace to this
empty pact, a view which appears to be shared by vi rtually all
o f the other signatories.
Both treaties should be re-examined as part of a
through, in-depth review of ')Ur overall posi tion i n the
ern Pac ific wh ich
practices .

deri~es

~;es t-

from many treaties, agreements, and

It is to be hoped that the Commission on the Organ-

i zation of the G')vernment f or the Conduct of Foreign Policy and

-23-

the

F~reigr. Relati~ns

C~mmittee

will pursue intenGive

of the status of these treaties and other

c~mmitments

studie~

:n Asia,

and elsewhere, during the current Congress.
Until the Taiwan situation is clarified, we shall
probably find ourselves

lo~king

primarily to trade and other

exchanges for the cement of relations with the new China .
liaison offices--extraQrdinary edifices--which

~111

The

open soon

in ·Waahington·and Peking will facilitate this process .

Both

countries are carrying QUt the pledge of the Shanghai c'Jmrnunique,
re-emphasied in the February 22 communique, tQ br'Jaden
understanding thrQugh contacts and exchanges .

mu~ual

Fr'Jm my own

experience •n China last year, I am persuaded that this
personal interactiQn can be of great

signific~nce.

There is much tQ be learned from the culture of the
old China.

There is much,

to~,

to be le3rned from the innQv-

ations and practices of the new China.

From accupuncture to

the recycl:ng ')f human v1aste, hea 1 th, pollution, acr'Jss the

spectrum

~~

the current c ncerns

~f

Amer'cans--there is much

to be learned from the People's Republic .
lear~

too, from us in science, in
The

cr~ss - fertilization

The Chinese will

~echnology

ond the arts .

of human experiences has

been resumed between China and the United States.
educati~nal

interchange has begun anew .

are on the basis of eouality .

Th:s time the exchanges

This time the exchanges can

bring mutual and durable benefjt to both peoples.
more than

1,0~0 Americans--d~ct~rs,

scientists, bus:nessmen> and
Four groups of Chinese have
I am
time .

c~nfident

that the

The

professors,

p~litical

n~w

tw~-way

Last year.

j~urnalists,

leaders--v{sited China.

come to see us and to show us .
flow will accelerate wjth

- 25 E.xchanges cost a great deal of money .
fer example, that a three-week tour of
Orchestra could cost

a'.Jo~.t

Chi~a

by

I am

.:.nfc~ed,

the Philadelphia

$350; 000, even •,:ith the Chinese

paying all in-country costs .

The amo· nts are large even thou!Sh

they are insit:?;nificant when compared with the waste which still
attaches to the pursuit of our foreign and military policies in
and around the rim of Asia .
It would be my expectation that funds for cultural
exchange with China could be made available out of savings in
these areas .
·y

Con~Sresa

Indeed, one of the contributions which can be made
is to assert

about such a shift .

~udgetary

priorities that '•lill bring

Small investments in exchanges by both

countries, can pay rich dividends in mutual understanding ,
friendly contact and c·ul tural enrici1ment .
A special respo •. sibility devoLtes on the Congress
the field of trade vti th China .

i~

Good tradjng relations r:1ean good

foreign relations and especially at this time .

The

Chi~ese

- 26 have a r ·c-,r:l of scrup...·::!.o--sly living up to agreerr:ents to ·.·hich
they put their signatures, ·.·rhether sales contracts cr political
settlements .
China's needs from abroad have been deliberately
restrained .

In the past decade or more , the Chinese have looked

to their

resources for economic building blocks, concen-

o~m

tratinf on developing a largely self-contained productive
capacity .

Such foreign trade as there is remains governed by

two basic principles :

(1) equality and mutual benefit, and

( 2) exchange of what China has ir. surplus for rthat is lacking.
As a general practice, a rough balance is maintained between
imports and exports .

Hence, China has no external debts of

any consequence .
As economic development accelerates, there may be
changes in the Chinese approach to trade relations \'Tith the
outside world .
to be expected .

For the present,

ho~tever,

no sudden change is

Secause the doors to America 1 s ware.1ouses have

at last been unsealed does not mean that Chinese traders will

- 2'l -

rush to enter and

s·~ch

bill boards as there are in China are

not available for the advertising of foreign products .
are

used~

They

rather, to stress Chinese effort in prod ction even

as they urce restraint in Chine3e consumption .
China ' s foreign trade is small .
was estimated to be $5
and exports.

billion ~

In 1972 the total

roughly balanced between imports

That amounts to a trade turnover of less than

one-half of one percent of our gross national product .
U. s . trade with China has responded promptly to the
removal of the embargo by President Nixon .
fair last

fall~

At the Canton trade

for example, there were 75 American businessmen,

twice the number attending the spring fair .

From $5 million

in 1971, U. s. - China trade increased to $92 million last year;
~60

million in exports to

China~

primarily of farm products,

and $23 million in imports from China .

Exports to China could

reach $350 million this year, with the shipment of Boeing 707s
and the sale of large amounts of cotton and ot1er farm products.

- 23 Even the most optimistic observers, however, co not believe
China's exports to the United States will exceed $50 million
this year .
Part of the disparity derives from U.
crimination against Chi nese imports .

s.

tariff dis-

Until caught up in t he

frenzy of cold war J t r aditional trade policy was to give mostfavored-nation treatment to imports from all countries) re gar dl ess of politics .

But tv:enty- t\'IO years ar;o 1 the Chinese

mainland J along with other Communist countries) was denied that
treatment .
The President has no\·t negotiated a trade agreement
with the Soviet Union providing for most- favored-nation treatment.

There is no r eas on whatsoever to do less 1 in my judg-

ment J with regard to Peking .

It has been estimated that about

50 percent of China ' s exports to the Ur.ited States are affected
by l ack of most- favo r ed- nation treatment .

The present 3ross

trade imbalance with China cannot continue indefinitely .

- 29 Either Chinese purchases here will drop or more will have to
be bought from China or new multi-angular patterns of trade
Hill have to be encouraged in the \•/estern Pacific.
It would be my hope that Congress will provide
authority to negotiate a most-favored-nation arrangement with
China along the lines of the recent agreement with the Soviet
Union .

Such an arrangement could be consummated, notwithstand-

ing the absence of formal

diplorr.~tic

relations.

I should note

that with regard to the Soviet Union, the pending trade- agreement
is now clouded by the Mills - Jackson amendment which relates to
the emigration payments required of Soviet Je\·rs seeking to go
to Israel .

That should not deter Congressional action on most-

favored-nation treatment for China .

The two situations are not

analogous and it would be most unfortunate to lose momentum
which has been generated in the Sino - U. S . rapprochement over
what is an unrelated issue in Europe .

- 30 In closing> I

wo~ld

reiterate that a China policy

based on myth and self-deception has been a major factor in
the atmosphere of crises in which we have lived since the end
of i'Torld Har II.

Before the Nixon Administration neither the

Executive Branch nor the Congress did very much to rectify our
relationship with the new China .

The President ' s initiative

in going to Peking has brought us, at last, to grips \'lith t.t:is
neglected situation .

It remains for the Legislative Branch, noH,

to take action to remove the accumulated legal barnacles of the
past .

In

so doing> congress Nill join tangi:.)ly \'{ith the

President in normalizing our relations Nith the Chinese People ' s
Republic .
In doing so> moreover, Congress Nill contribute to

the improvement of the prospects for peace in the \/estern
Pacific and .in the world .

There is no doubt that \V'hat happens

in and arovnd China forms an encrmous segment of those prospects even though China eschews the label "Great PO\'Ier . 11
Chinese society> today, is strong and unified perhaps as

ne~er

- 31 before in history .

It has a dynamism based on a

and all for one" concept .

11

0ne for all

"Serve the people" is more than a

slogan, it is a national way of life .

To visit China is to feel.

personally, the vitality of a vast, intelligent and highly
competent people and the social enthusiasm which has been generated by their new society.

The visible differences between China

today and twenty years ago are stupendous .
ferences may even be greater .

The invisible dif-

All indications are that the

next ten years are likely to add enormously to what has already
been achieved .
Ide are entered on a new era of relations with China.
!Jle

cannot wipe the slate of tre past clean and start afresh.

Neither political nor personal relationships are so

for~iving .

Even now, we confront a residue of stumbling blocks from the
past, many of which go back to the 19th century in the form of
superior- inferior concepts of China.

The job of removing these

blocks insofar as they derive from official policy and law

- 32 rests with the Pres:!.dent and the cc:1gress.
the job is educational.

As 't·Te proceed to do jvhat must be doneJ

howeverJ the path will open to a new era of
Western Pacific .

In a deeper sense,

stabili~y

in the

It will be an er.a basedJ not on the military

preeminence of any single nation but on the mutual efforts and
forebearance of all the concerned nations .

There is every

reason to expect that the new China will join with us and
others in building

t~at

kind of a peace in the PacificJ a

peace \•fhich can be derived through patienceJ perseverance and
perspicacity .

